A police officer opened a sleeping man’s car door in Michigan, discovered a firearm, and triggered a criminal prosecution. But a seemingly minor detail about that door would become central to an explosive constitutional dispute.
On July 26, 2025, employees at an MSU Federal Credit Union branch in Lansing noticed an unfamiliar black Cadillac parked behind their building. Concerned about its presence, they contacted the Lansing Police Department.
The Cadillac had dark-tinted windows, making it difficult for employees to see inside. Workers did not recognize the vehicle as belonging to anyone employed there, and they believed it might have remained overnight.
Officer Hayden Havard responded to the call at the credit union’s location on East Jolly Road. With more than three years of experience at the Lansing Police Department, he approached the parked vehicle to investigate.
Inside the Cadillac, Havard found Miguel Perez apparently asleep in the front seat. There had been no reported violence, threats, or suspicious behavior by the occupant, only concerns about the unfamiliar vehicle’s presence.
The officer knocked on the window, attempting to wake Perez. According to Havard’s later testimony, Perez reached toward the interior door handle and began opening the vehicle door after becoming aware of the officer.
What happened during the following seconds would eventually become the most contested element of the entire case. Havard acknowledged that he grabbed the exterior handle and assisted in pulling the door completely open.
With the door open, Havard noticed a black firearm positioned in a cup holder on the vehicle’s center console. He described the weapon as visible from outside once the door had been opened.
The officer reached into the Cadillac and secured the firearm. He subsequently determined that the magazine contained ammunition, making the discovery particularly significant for the investigation and potential criminal charges against Perez.
Perez told Havard that he possessed a concealed pistol license and produced documentation supporting that claim. However, the officer discovered that the license had expired approximately one or two years before the encounter.
Havard seized the firearm but allowed Perez to leave the parking lot. Rather than arresting him immediately, the officer forwarded his findings to the Ingham County Prosecutor’s Office for consideration of criminal charges.
Prosecutors eventually charged Perez with carrying a concealed weapon. The allegation concerned his possession of a pistol inside the vehicle while lacking a currently valid concealed pistol license under Michigan law.
The case reached the 54A District Court on May 29, 2026, for a preliminary examination before Judge Kristen Simmons. Perez appeared with defense attorney Barnett Levine to challenge the prosecution’s case.
At this stage, the question was not whether Perez had been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Prosecutors needed to establish probable cause sufficient to send the felony charge forward to circuit court.
The prosecution called Officer Havard as its only witness. His testimony would determine whether the state possessed sufficient evidence connecting Perez to the alleged concealed weapon offense and supporting further criminal proceedings.
Havard described arriving at the credit union, approaching the Cadillac, and finding Perez asleep. He testified that the gun became visible immediately after the vehicle door opened and that he secured it.
Initially, the account appeared relatively straightforward. The officer had responded to a suspicious vehicle complaint, observed a firearm, checked the driver’s licensing information, and referred the matter to prosecutors.
But defense attorney Levine began probing details the prosecution’s questioning had left largely unexplored. His questions focused not simply on the gun itself, but on the circumstances that made the weapon visible.
Levine first challenged the original basis for police involvement. He asked whether credit union employees had reported anything suspicious about the person inside the vehicle, rather than merely describing an unfamiliar parked Cadillac.
Havard acknowledged that the employees had not provided information identifying suspicious behavior by the occupant. Their concern centered on the car’s presence and their inability to determine who might be inside.
That distinction mattered because police generally require specific legal justification for investigative detentions. Merely appearing unusual or unfamiliar does not necessarily establish reasonable suspicion that someone has committed a crime.
Levine also questioned whether anyone knew how long the Cadillac had occupied the parking space. Havard admitted he lacked precise information, although employees reportedly believed the vehicle might have been there overnight.
The defense then turned toward the crucial moment when the vehicle door opened. Levine asked directly whether Havard had participated in opening it, forcing the officer to clarify his earlier description.
Havard acknowledged that Perez had started opening the door from inside, but that he then grabbed the exterior handle and assisted in pulling it farther open, rather than simply observing from outside.
The distinction immediately complicated the officer’s account. If Perez voluntarily exposed the vehicle interior, the firearm might have been lawfully visible. If Havard exceeded the scope of Perez’s consent, constitutional problems could arise.
Levine pressed Havard about what conduct supposedly demonstrated permission to open the door completely. The officer responded that he had interpreted Perez’s body language, specifically his initial effort to open the door, as consent.
The attorney continued asking how far the door had actually moved before Havard grabbed the handle. The officer could not recall the precise distance, leaving an important factual question unresolved by his testimony.
Levine also questioned Havard about the interior door handle, seeking details about how Perez supposedly operated it. The exchange became contentious as the attorney challenged the officer’s ability to remember the movement accurately.
Havard admitted he could not describe several specifics about the handle or precisely how Perez had manipulated it. Nevertheless, he maintained that Perez had initiated opening the door before the officer assisted.
The defense then established another critical fact. Havard agreed that he had not observed the firearm until the car door was completely open, making the legality of that opening central to the prosecution.
Under the Fourth Amendment, people enjoy protection against unreasonable government searches and seizures. Courts have recognized that vehicle interiors receive constitutional protection, even though automobiles are subject to certain exceptions unavailable to private homes.
The plain view doctrine can permit officers to seize evidence without a warrant when they observe it from a lawful position, its incriminating nature is immediately apparent, and they possess lawful access.
But an officer cannot necessarily create a lawful observation by conducting an unjustified search. If opening a car door unlawfully exposes evidence, the resulting discovery may not qualify for the plain view exception.
This raised a direct challenge to Havard’s explanation. If Perez had consented to the full opening, the firearm’s visibility could support the seizure. Without adequate consent, the same discovery might be constitutionally problematic.
The defense’s argument therefore depended on a movement lasting only seconds. Who actually opened the door, how far Perez had moved it, and what permission his conduct conveyed became potentially decisive questions.
After cross-examination concluded, the prosecution argued that the evidence established probable cause. Perez had occupied a vehicle containing a firearm and possessed a concealed pistol license that was no longer valid.
The prosecutor also emphasized that the credit union employees had legitimate reasons to request police assistance. An unfamiliar vehicle had remained in their parking lot, apparently before normal business operations began.
According to the state’s presentation, Perez opened the door himself, exposing the firearm to the officer. The prosecution maintained that the discovery supported the concealed weapon charge and justified continuing the case.
Levine strongly disagreed. He argued that the prosecution had established no actual suspicious behavior by Perez before Havard approached, and that simply sleeping in a parked vehicle was not evidence of criminal activity.
The attorney emphasized that investigators could not identify how long Perez had been there. Without that information, he argued, the presence of the Cadillac before employees arrived had limited evidentiary significance.
Levine also challenged any suggestion that Perez had been preparing to commit a crime against the credit union. The defense noted that officers found him asleep rather than observing conduct consistent with such an allegation.
Finally, Levine returned to the door itself. The officer had admittedly assisted its opening, and the firearm became visible only afterward, creating a serious question about whether the discovery resulted from authorized police conduct.
Judge Simmons listened to both arguments before explaining the preliminary examination standard. Prosecutors did not need to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but they did need evidence supporting probable cause.
She identified the essential elements of the charge, including the presence of a pistol inside the vehicle, Perez’s awareness of the weapon, and his participation in carrying or concealing it.
The judge found the evidence sufficient to establish that a firearm had been inside the Cadillac. Havard’s testimony also supported the prosecution’s account that Perez possessed an expired concealed pistol license.
Simmons acknowledged that the circumstances surrounding the door presented a factual dispute. She specifically considered whether Havard had merely helped Perez finish opening it or had exercised authority beyond what Perez permitted.
Importantly, the judge explained that she had not reviewed video showing the door opening. Without such footage, she had to evaluate the officer’s account based on the testimony presented during the hearing.
Simmons accepted Havard’s testimony for purposes of the preliminary examination. She concluded that questions about the exact door movement and consent could be examined further during later proceedings in circuit court.
The judge also concluded that Havard had legitimate grounds to approach and investigate the Cadillac after receiving the employees’ complaint. She distinguished that initial police contact from the separate question about opening the door.
Ultimately, Simmons found probable cause and ordered Perez’s case transferred to the Ingham County Circuit Court. The decision allowed prosecution to continue without resolving every constitutional issue raised by the defense.
The matter was assigned a June 10 bindover date, an administrative step for transferring the case. Perez was informed that his attorney would receive further scheduling information concerning the circuit court proceedings.
Then, after the judge had announced her decision, another troubling detail emerged. The attorneys discussed the absence of body camera footage covering the precise moment when the vehicle door had been opened.
The defense explained that no video of the disputed door movement had been produced. The available recording apparently covered other portions of the encounter, but not the particular seconds central to the constitutional dispute.
Judge Simmons immediately sought clarification. She asked whether the body camera had been off during that specific portion of the encounter and when recording had resumed afterward, recognizing the significance of the missing footage.
The exchange revealed that the essential moment was not available for the judge to examine. As a result, the competing interpretations of Perez’s actions and Havard’s assistance remained dependent on testimony rather than video.
The discussion did not establish that anyone had deliberately erased or concealed evidence. It did, however, identify a significant absence in the available record, precisely where independent visual confirmation could have helped.
Simmons recognized that the missing footage raised a question requiring further examination. She had already found sufficient probable cause, but the legality of the door opening remained open to additional legal challenges.
The defense could seek further review through a motion to suppress evidence in circuit court. Such a motion would directly address whether the officer’s actions violated constitutional protections and affected admissibility of the firearm.
According to the original account, the case remained unresolved when the episode was prepared. A final pretrial was scheduled for August 26, 2026, with a jury trial scheduled for September 21, 2026.
Those dates reflected the schedule reported at that time, not confirmation that the proceedings ultimately occurred as planned. The supplied account did not establish a subsequent verdict, dismissal, or final resolution of the prosecution.
The legal controversy illustrated how ordinary police conduct can create complex constitutional consequences. Opening a vehicle door may appear insignificant, yet the resulting exposure of an interior can determine whether evidence was lawfully obtained.
For Havard, the central issue was whether Perez’s movements reasonably indicated consent. For the defense, the concern was whether the officer had exceeded that permission and independently exposed evidence otherwise hidden from view.
Neither side disputed that the firearm was present according to the testimony. Instead, the dispute concerned whether the government had obtained its evidence from a constitutionally permissible position during the initial encounter.
The missing body camera footage gave the controversy an additional dimension. Had the precise movement been recorded, a court might have been better equipped to evaluate consent, physical participation, and the officer’s credibility.
Without that recording, the legal dispute depended heavily on recollections of actions that unfolded in seconds. The absence of footage did not establish misconduct, but it limited the available evidence concerning an important factual question.
Perez’s preliminary examination ended with the felony charge advancing, not with a determination of guilt. Judge Simmons left the constitutional challenge unresolved while preserving the opportunity for further examination in circuit court.
The case demonstrates why police procedures matter beyond the immediate discovery of suspected evidence. A firearm may be physically present, but whether authorities can rely on its discovery may depend on how they obtained access.
What began with an unfamiliar Cadillac outside a Michigan credit union ultimately centered on a single door handle. The unresolved question was whether an officer’s brief assistance crossed the constitutional boundary separating observation from search.
